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Abstract 
 
 
This paper adopts a fixed-effect panel methodology that enables us to take into account both TFP and neoclassical convergence. 
We use a sample of 76 countries, 1960-2003 and estimate TFP values obtained by using different estimators such as LSDV, Kiviet-
corrected LSDV, and GMM à la Arellano and Bond. In our estimates, cross-country TFP dynamics shows that most countries in 
the sample do not catch up with the USA. We also find conditional convergence in TFP levels and that human capital acts as a 
robust enhancing factor of technology adoption, as suggested by Nelson and Phelps in 1966. In contrast with previous evidence, in 
our results even very low level of human capital stocks allow a country to enter a “conditional TFP convergence club” – a result 
again consistent with the original version of the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis. Further, our results imply a plausible link between 
stages of development and returns to different levels of education. Finally, the positive influence of human capital on technology 
catch up is robust to the inclusion of controls for a country’s institutional quality. 
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1. Introduction  
 A large body of empirical evidence on cross-country economic growth reveals that per capita income 
tends to converge to country-specific steady-states, and that sigma-convergence is generally absent. In other 
words, the world income distribution does not become less dispersed over time, with poor countries on average 
failing to grow faster than the rich ones [Pritchett (1997), Durlauf et al. (2005) and Grier et al. (2007)]. Another 
robust empirical result is that the large gaps in cross-country per capita income are mostly accounted for by 
differences in total factor productivity (TFP), rather than in factors of production [Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997), Hall and Jones (1999)].1 
 The coexistence of a weak process of absolute convergence and of large TFP differentials poses an 
interesting question. In theory, the large differences in the estimated TFP levels are a potential source of flows of 
technology from advanced to less developed countries and, therefore, of income convergence. However, the 
very weakness of global convergence suggests the possibility that for many lagging countries this lever is not as 
simple to use as a number of models would postulate.2 This difficulty might be due to their human capital stocks 
being too low, as firstly suggested by Nelson and Phelps (1966), or to the lacking quality of their institutions, as 
in Hall and Jones (1999) and in Acemoglu et al. (2001), or to the existence of monopoly rights of various forms 
that create a barrier to technology adoption, as in Parente and Prescott (1999).  
In this paper we address two main questions. First, is convergence weak because technology catch-up is 
weak, in spite of the large differentials in technology? Second, if technology diffusion fails to materialize in many 
countries, what are the reasons for this failure? In particular, how important is human capital in favouring cross-
country diffusion of technology?  
These are old standing important questions. As maintained more than ten years ago by Bernard and 
Jones (1996), these questions call for direct analysis of the evolution of cross-country TFP levels over time.3 A 
decade later, only partial answers are available. One possible reason for this is that estimating TFP levels and 
identifying the role of technology diffusion within income convergence is not simple. Existing empirical analyses 
confirm this difficulty: a number of different methodologies have been adopted, none of which has emerged as a 
recognized standard, and the evidence produced so far is not uniform. As section 2 below documents in details, 
the available evidence ranges from supporting strong conditional convergence in TFP levels to suggesting that 
the observed cross-country TFP dynamics is mostly due to random shocks.  
To help clarify the matter, our first step is to adopt a methodology that allows us to estimate TFP at 
different points in time. Our choice builds on Islam (2003a), in which the presence of TFP heterogeneity in 
cross-country convergence analysis is tested by using a fixed-effects panel estimator in a standard convergence 
equation framework. It has been shown that this framework can be used to examine cases in which TFP 
differences in levels are not constants and, therefore, to test for the presence of TFP convergence. The main 
feature of this framework is that TFP levels are estimated by means of growth regressions in which the 
contribution of factor accumulation – namely, capital deepening – to income convergence is taken into account. 
By doing this, we limit the risk of overstating the role of TFP dynamics within that process.4 
The robustness of our results is assessed by comparing the estimates obtained by using different 
estimators, namely, OLS, a Least Square with Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator, a biased-corrected LSDV 
estimator (Kiviet, 1995) and a GMM (Arellano-Bond, 1991) estimator. We use a procedure suggested by Bond et 
al. (2001) and Monte Carlo results to select plausible estimates.  
We use data on GDP per capita of 76 countries, both developed and less developed, over the period 
                                                 
1 On the role of TFP heterogeneity in cross-country analysis see also in Parente and Prescott (1999), Easterly and Levine 
(2001), and Lucas (2000) among the many others. Few economists dispute these findings. Among them see Young (1994) 
and, more recently, Baier et al. (2002). 
2 For instance, in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) technology diffusion is instantaneous and complete, so that differences in 
TFP levels across countries are a purely random phenomenon. 
3 As Bernard and Jones (1996, p. 1043) put it, “Why do countries have different levels of technology? How do technologies 
change over time?”. Until these questions are not answered, they add, we do not know “how much of the convergence that 
we observe is due to convergence in technology versus convergence in capital-labour ratios”. 
4 More generally, this methodology offers various advantages with respect to existing alternatives. In particular, it neither call 
for the imposition of too many assumptions nor it requires the use of large datasets. These problems may be present, for 
instance, with techniques such as growth/level accounting and DEA. See section 2 below and Di Liberto et al. (2008) for 
more details.  
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1960-2003.5 It is worth underlining that this time span includes the Nineties, a decade characterized by the IT 
revolution, a phenomenon known to be the source of a significant asymmetric shock on cross-country 
productivity levels, with the USA and the more developed economies as the major beneficiaries.6 Our data are 
mainly from the Penn World Tables (2006) with the exception of human capital data, which are from Barro and 
Lee (2000),7 and of indexes of institutional quality, which are based on data from the International Risk Guide and 
on openness to trade from Sachs and Warner (1995).8  
Our results confirm that cross-country gaps in TFP levels are wide, that they are persistent, and that they 
are an important component of GDP per capita dynamics. In particular, we find an absence of TFP convergence 
in a period in which the same phenomenon characterises cross-country GDP per capita. The persistence of TFP 
differentials is strongly confirmed by the analysis of the shape of the whole cross-country distribution, which 
remains almost identical across periods. The link between TFP and GDP cross-country performances in time is 
further supported by the strong correlation existing between changes in TFP and GDP rankings. Concerning 
individual country’s performances, our analysis shows that in recent years the USA have consolidated their long-
standing leadership in cross-country TFP levels.  
In relation to why cross-country TFP gaps tend to be persistent, we produce new evidence strongly 
supporting one of the most influential hypothesis on technology convergence, due to Nelson and Phelps (1966) 
and based on the idea that a lagging country’s capability to absorb technology from abroad is proportional to its 
technology gap and to its stock of human capital (see also Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). In particular, our 
evidence (i) detects a process of TFP convergence conditional to the stock of human capital in the population; 
(ii) shows that the role of human capital turns out to be robust to the inclusion of various and widely used 
indexes of social infrastructure and openness (iii) shows that even very low level of human capital stocks allow a 
country to enter a “conditional TFP convergence club”. Point (ii) and (iii) in particular differ from previous 
results reported in the literature. Point (ii) is in contrast with the idea that "the determinants of social 
infrastructure affect [productivity] only through social infrastructure and not directly", as put forward by Hall 
and Jones (1999), while point (iii) challenges the idea that convergence is trigged only if a threshold level of 
human capital is reached [Benhabib and Spiegel, (2005)]. In our evidence this threshold is so low that it can be 
ignored, and this yields further support to the original version of the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis. 
Finally, we decompose our total human capital proxy into its components of primary, secondary and 
tertiary education, and find that there is a plausible link between stages of development and returns to different 
levels of education as suggested by recent studies (Vandenbussche et al., 2006). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the main papers on cross-country 
TFP dynamics. In section 3 we describe our chosen methodology to estimate TFP levels at different point in 
time, while in section 4 we discuss how to select the estimator that suits our case better and presents our 
evidence on the degree of cross-country TFP heterogeneity. Section 5 shows how much TFP convergence can 
be detected in our dataset and section 6 tests if our TFP estimates are positively correlated with the observed 
human capital endowments. Finally, section 7 shows some evidence on the specific role on TFP growth played 
by different levels of education. Conclusions are in section 8. 
 
2.  Review of the literature  
There exists a well known large body of empirical studies on convergence in which the assumption of 
cross-country TFP homogeneity is relaxed but no analysis of changes in TFP levels over time is offered.9 In this 
section we focus exclusively on recent papers based on large samples of countries in which TFP dynamic 
patterns are addressed explicitly.10 
                                                 
5 The time span in our paper is significantly longer than those used by most of the other available papers on TFP dynamics. 
Typically, they do not extend the analysis beyond 1990. See section 2 below.  
6 See Jorgenson (2005). 
7 The sample of 76 countries is the largest obtainable with these datasets: version 6.2 of Heston et al. (2006), and Barro Lee 
(2000), human capital updated files.  
8 See section 6 below for further details. 
9 Among the most influential see Islam (1995), Klenow and Rodriguez Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) that use a 
single TFP estimate.  
10 For a brief survey of previous studies on TFP convergence see Islam (2003b). These studies do not usually examine large 
samples of countries.  
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As we have noticed in the Introduction, empirical results in this area are both far from uniform and 
difficult to compare. We start with those papers which claim that some cross-country TFP convergence is 
present and that some key determinants of the process can be identified.  
Aiyar and Feyrer (2002) apply growth accounting techniques to estimate TFP levels for a sample of 86 
countries for the period 1960-1990. The estimated TFP values are then used to perform a standard conditional 
convergence regression analysis. They use fixed-effects estimators to control for unobserved cross-country 
differences in geography and institutions. They find that technology catch-up is present in the form of 
conditional convergence in technology levels. About the determinants behind the process, they report that “the 
level of human capital has a positive effect on a country’s ability to take advantage of technological spillovers”, 
thus providing support to the Nelson and Phelps (1966) hypothesis. Another influential paper on the Nelson-
Phelps hypothesis is Benhabib and Spiegel (2005)11. In this paper, they let human capital to be the source of 
“domestic innovation” as well as a determinant of technology adoption from abroad. TFP values are first 
estimated and then used as the dependent variable in growth regressions based on a sample of 75 countries over 
the 1960-95 period. The catch-up term turns out to be by far the major channel through which human capital 
enhances TFP growth in lagging countries. Another contribution of Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) is worth 
underlining – namely, their extension of the Nelson-Phelps approach to include the possibility that, unless a 
critical value of human capital stock is reached, the catch-up mechanism is not activated. In their evidence, this 
critical level does exist and turns out to be rather high, so that 27 countries out of 75 were below it in 1960.  
Dowrick and Rogers (2002) study cross-country conditional convergence over the 1965-1990 period. 
Using country data on capital stocks and GDP per worker they model the rate of growth of the latter as a 
function of both “classical” and “technology” convergence. They too find that less developed countries benefit 
from technology transfer, and that secondary education strengthen the process. No explicit analysis of TFP 
dynamics is present in the paper: technology differentials are proxied by output per worker, a variable that can 
reflect many factors other than technology.12 
Another paper that finds a positive role for TFP dynamics on GDP convergence is Wong (2007). 
Applying a yet different empirical methodology – namely, channel decomposition – to a sample of 77 countries 
from 1960 to 1985, Wong (2007) reports that while TFP growth is the main contributor to GDP per capita 
convergence, the contribution of human and physical capital is  negligible. As in the previous study, no explicit 
analysis of cross-country TFP convergence and of its determinants is developed in the paper.13 
Other papers are more doubtful about the strength of technological diffusion as a systematic source of 
income convergence. For example, Islam (2003a) finds “encouraging signs” that technological diffusion is taking 
place, although in a rather weak form. This is the paper closest to ours. Nevertheless, in Islam’s paper, TFP 
estimates are not used for an econometric analysis of mechanisms of technology convergence/divergence, as it is 
done here. In his descriptive analysis based on a sample of 83 countries for the period 1960-90, Islam (2003a) 
finds some persistency in the estimated country rankings of relative TFP, with most countries nonetheless 
improving with respect to the USA (in our analysis, extended to include 2003, we find that the opposite is true).  
Similarly to Dowrick and Rogers (2002), Kumar and Russell (2002) use data on physical capital stocks 
and therefore study technological convergence in a reduced sample of 57 countries between 1965 and 1990. 
They apply the Data Envelop Analysis (DEA) to decompose productivity growth into shifts of the world 
production frontier, technological catch-up, and capital-deepening, and find that “technological catch-up ... has 
done little, if anything, to lower income inequality across countries” (p. 537), because both richer and poorer 
countries seems to have benefited from the diffusion of technology. This result points to the possibilities that 
either the size of a poorer country’s technology gap is not a determinant of the process of technology absorption 
from abroad, or that unfavourable differences in some conditioning factors (human capital, for instance) offset 
                                                 
11 In a previous 1994 paper, they find that the catch-up term is often a significant determinant of GDP growth, and that 
human capital exerts a much stronger influence on GDP growth through this channel rather than through the “domestic 
innovation” mechanism. This evidence is based on per capita GDP cross-country growth regressions for 78 countries over 
the 1965-85 period.  
12 The sample used in the paper is limited to 57 countries due to availability of data on capital stocks, and countries excluded 
from it are mainly developing countries. 
13 Another paper on TFP convergence is Miller and Upadhyay (2002), where absolute convergence in TFP is found in a 
sample of 83 countries for the period 1960-89. In this paper, however, the econometric problems of estimating a dynamic 
panel data model (see section 4 below) are not addressed.  
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the positive role of that gap.  
Finally, McQueen and Whelan (2007) use data on cross-country capital-output ratios to estimate the 
speed of convergence in a sample of 96 countries over the period 1960-2000. They detect a rather higher than 
usual speed of conditional convergence, and find that most of the cross-country variation in growth rates is due 
to variations in TFP. In their view, however, TFP variations are more likely to reflect random shocks à la 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) than patterns of systematic technology catch-up.14  
 
3.  A Panel Data approach to estimate TFP convergence 
Our aim is to investigate cross-country TFP heterogeneity and convergence by using an appropriate 
fixed-effect panel estimator. Islam (1995) was among the first to suggest this econometric solution to the 
problem of allowing for TFP heterogeneity in convergence analysis.15 In particular, he extended the standard 
Mankiw et al. (1992) structural approach by allowing TFP levels to vary across individual economies, together 
with saving rates and population growth rates. Unlike in the Mankiw et al. (1992) approach, Islam (1995) 
introduced the idea that the unobservable differences in TFP are correlated with other regressors, and uses 
suitable panel techniques to estimate:  
 
    iti
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,    j=1,2     (1) 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of per capita GDP (measured in terms of population working age), 
 is the transitory term that varies across countries. The remaining terms are: 
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where Ai0 represents the initial level of technology, and s, n, δ  are, respectively, the saving rate, the population 
growth rate, the depreciation rate; g is the exogenous rate of technological change,16 assumed to be invariant 
across individual economies; α is the usual capital share of a standard Cobb-Douglas production function; 
finally, e λτβ −≡ , where ( )( )1 n gλ α δ= − + +  represents the convergence parameter and 2 1t tτ ≡ −  is the 
time span considered.  
In this specification, technology is represented by two terms. The first term, iμ , is a time-invariant 
component that varies across economies and should control for various unobservable factors. The second is the 
time trend component (eq. 7) that captures the growth rate of the technology frontier assumed constant across 
individuals. Once we have the estimated individual intercepts, we can obtain an index of TFP by computing: 
                                                 
14 Similarly, Hausmann and Pritchett (2005) find that in a panel of 110 countries covering the 1957-1992 period, episodes of 
growth accelerations in GDP per capita are poorly predicted by standard growth determinants, and that they appear to be 
caused mostly by idiosyncratic changes. 
15 See also Caselli et al. (1996) and Islam (2003a) among others. 
16 As is standard in this literature, (g+δ) is assumed equal to 0.05. 
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Since TFP estimates include all unobservable components assumed to be different across countries but 
constant over time such as technology gaps (more on this presently), culture and institutions, and since these 
components are likely to be correlated with other regressors, a fixed effect estimator is appropriate.  If we apply 
LSDV to equation (1), individual effects may be directly estimated. With other estimators, such as Within Group 
or Arellano-Bond (1991), estimates of iμ  and, thus, of ( )iA 0ˆ  can be obtained through equation (1) by: 17 
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The main problem with this methodology is that, while it was designed to control for the presence of 
cross-country TFP heterogeneity, it rules out technology convergence by assumption. More precisely, equation 
(1) is obtained by log-linearizing the Solow model around the steady-state under the assumption of a stationary 
degree of TFP heterogeneity. In other words, technology in all economies is assumed to grow at the same rate 
whatever their position relative to the world frontier. This is in sharp contrast with the technological catch-up 
hypothesis. In the latter, a country’s “technology gap” – if higher than its stationary value18 – may enhance its 
TFP growth rate during the transition towards a steady state in which all economies will grow at the common 
rate g. As a consequence, a high degree of cross-country technology differentials is likely to be the source of TFP 
convergence.  
Hence, how can we use equation (1) to test for the presence/absence of technological convergence? The 
solution is to estimate TFP values over several subsequent periods, in order to test whether the observed time 
pattern is consistent either with the catch-up hypothesis or with the alternative hypothesis that the current degree 
of technology heterogeneity is at its stationary value.19 
More in details, differently from Islam (1995) we use PWT 6.2 data on GDP per worker 1960-2003 to 
estimate the following equation: 
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j
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3
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,
~~~         (11) 
it it ty y y= −% ,     it it tx x x= −%      (12) 
 
where ty  and tx  are the world averages in period t: data are taken in difference from the sample mean, in order 
to control for the presence of a time trend component tη  and of a likely common stochastic trend (the common 
                                                 
17 See Caselli et al. (1996). We are excluding the time dummies since in our analysis data are transformed as in equation (12).  
18 In models of technology catch-up, stationary values of technology gaps are determined by differences in the countries’ 
fundamentals. If the follower countries’ gaps are beyond their stationary values, cross-country TFP dynamics should be 
characterized by a process of conditional convergence. More on this in section 6 below. 
19 Splitting a longer period in several subperiods has an additional advantage, since the longer the time dimension of the 
panel, the higher the risk that differences in TFP levels are not constant due to the presence of technological diffusion. In 
other words, equation (1) is likely to be an approximation of the real process – an approximation that deteriorates as the 
length of the period under analysis increases. 
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component of technology) across countries.20 We use a standard five-year time span in order to control for 
business cycle fluctuations and serial correlation, which are likely to affect the data in the short run. Moreover, 
we include the 2003 observation as our last observation in order to embrace the longest possible sample.21 In 
terms of TFP convergence, these latter years are important in that developments in IT have been “… a rapidly 
rising source of aggregate productivity growth throughout the 1990's”.22 The additional regressor itx ,3  is an 
index of a country’s stock of human capital based on the average years of schooling.23 As we shall see, excluding 
human capital from the analysis does not change our results. All these variables are taken at their t-5 level to 
reduce endogeneity problems.  
We improve on Islam (2003a) in three ways. First, Islam (2003a) estimates fixed effects, and thus TFP 
levels, using two estimators (the Minimum Distance, and system GMM) which, as we shall see below, do not 
represent an optimal choice in this context. Second, our period of analysis is significantly longer than his (i.e., 
1960-1990), and therefore includes years strongly influenced by the introduction of IT technologies (more on 
this below). Third, Islam (2003a) suggests that the methodology used in his paper should “provide a useful point 
of departure for a second-stage analysis geared toward finding the determinants of productivity” (p. 268), i.e., an 
analysis not developed in his paper. This is exactly what we aim to do in the present analysis.  
 
4. Estimating cross-country TFP levels in dynamic panel: small sample problems 
The first problem to solve when we estimate a dynamic panel data model such as the one represented by 
equation (11) is which estimator suits our case better. To this aim we carefully compare the results obtained by 
using three different estimators: LSDV, Arellano and Bond (1991) and Kiviet (1995). In our choice of estimators, 
we do not include the system-GMM suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Minimum Distance, both used 
by Islam (2003a). Reasons for this choice are as follows. First, the theoretical restrictions on which the system-
GMM estimator is based do not hold in this context.24 Second, the use of the Minimum Distance estimator has 
been highly criticised within the growth literature and, apart from Islam (2003a), there is a lack of empirical 
analysis that compares the performance of this estimator with other available estimator.25 
Concerning the estimators we adopt, the LSDV one, while consistent for large T, is characterised by 
small sample problems and it is known to produce downward biased estimates in small samples.26 Similar 
problems may be detected for the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator (GMM-AB from now on). It has recently 
been shown that, when T is small, and either the autoregressive parameter is close to one (highly persistent 
series), or the variance of the individual effect is high relative to the variance of the transient shock, then even 
the GMM-AB estimator is biased and, in particular, downward biased.27   
Our third estimator is based on Kiviet (1995), a paper that addresses the problem of the LSDV finite 
sample bias by proposing a small sample correction. Monte Carlo analysis (Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 
1999) finds that for balanced panel and small (less or equal to ten) or moderate T (T=30), such as the one we 
usually find in convergence literature, LSDV estimates corrected for the bias (KIVIET from now on) have more 
attractive properties than other available estimators.28 More recently, Everaert and Pozzi (2007) confirm this 
                                                 
20 The Levin et al. (2002) panel unit-root test performed on the demeaned GDP series reject the hypotheses that series are 
nonstationary.  
21 The use of the 2004 observation, available for a group of countries, would have drastically reduced the available cross-
country sample. 
22 See Jorgenson (2005).  
23 We use average years of schooling of the population over 15 years of age. See Barro and Lee (2000). 
24 In particular, this methodology requires that first-difference ityΔ  are not correlated with iμ  (see Bond et al., 2001), and 
this implies that to implement this estimator we need to assume the absence of technological catching-up. If efficiency 
growth is related to initial efficiency, the first difference of log output might be correlated with the individual effect.  
25 See Caselli et al. (1996).  
26 For more on dynamic panel data see Baltagi (2003). 
27 See Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond et al. (2001).  
28 In particular, these Monte Carlo studies explicitly analyse typical macro dynamic panels and find that for 20T ≤  and 
50N ≤ , the KIVIET and Anderson-Hsiao estimators consistently outperform GMM-AB. Moreover, despite having a 
higher average bias, KIVIET turns out to be more efficient than Anderson-Hsiao. 
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result and show that for samples similar to ours KIVIET consistently outperforms GMM-AB.29  
Let us now turn to our specific case. Our panel includes the period 1960-2003 for 76 countries. Using 
the five-year time span (or 5τ = ) implies that we are left with T=10 observations for each country. Given the 
dimension of our panel and the above discussion, the KIVIET estimator should be preferred. However, since 
there is a yet unsolved debate on which technique is clearly superior in finite samples, in the following analysis 
we will use all the above-listed estimators and will compare their results in order to assess their robustness and 
plausibility.  
Estimates of TFP levels over the whole sample period obtained by means of standard pooling OLS, 
LSDV, GMM-AB and KIVIET, are reported in Table 1. For each regression we include both our estimates and 
the implied value of the structural parameter λˆ , i.e. the speed of the convergence parameter.  
In analysing our results, we follow the procedure proposed by Bond et al. (2001). Their suggestion is to 
use the results obtained with LSDV and OLS as benchmarks to detect a possible bias in our other estimates. 
Since in dynamic panels the OLS coefficient in the lagged dependent variable is known to be biased upwards and 
the LSDV one downwards, Bond et al. (2001) suggest that the true estimate should lie between the two. This 
procedure is consistent with the literature on partial identification where, as Manski (2007) puts it, “a parameter 
is partially identified if the sampling process and maintained assumptions reveal that the parameter lies in a set, 
its ‘identification region’, that is smaller than the logical range of the parameter but larger than a single point”. In 
this specific case, since we presume that the true parameter values lie somewhere between ˆolsβ  and ˆLSDVβ , we 
expect its true value to be between 0.95 and 0.80 (as shown in Table 1) and we will exclude from our analysis 
estimators that produce results out of this range.  
When equation (11) is estimated with LSDV (Model 2) we find, as said above, an AR(1) coefficient of 0.80 and a 
correspondingly relatively high speed of convergence of 4.4%. Among the regressors, both the coefficients on 
the lagged dependent variable and on population growth are significant and have the expected sign, while the 
coefficient on human capital is not significant. These results will be confirmed when other estimation procedures 
are used.  
As expected, the use of the Kiviet correction procedure increases the LSDV parameter. In Model 3 
(KIVIET), the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 0.93, with a decrease in the corresponding speed of 
convergence coefficient from 4% to 1.5%. Clearly KIVIET satisfies the above-quoted Bond et al. (2001) criterion 
as the estimated AR(1) coefficient lies between ˆolsβ  and ˆLSDVβ .30  
Let us now extend our comparison to the other estimators. The GMM-AB estimator may be performed 
under very different assumptions on the endogeneity of the included regressors. In this study we adopt two 
opposite hypotheses on the additional regressors 'x s . First, Model 4 (or Model GMM-AB1) in Table 1 assumes 
that all 'x s  are predetermined,31 while Model 5 (or Model GMM-AB2) assumes instead that all regressors are 
strictly exogenous. Results in Table 1 on both the Sargan and the AB-2 test say that both specifications are valid 
and the estimated AR(1) coefficients do not suggest any presence of bias. Our choice is for Model 4 since the 
increase of the p-value of the Sargan test in GMM-AB1 indicates that treating the included regressors as 
predetermined makes it more difficult to reject the null. 
 
 
                                                 
29 We use the results obtained with the following sample: N=100, T=5 or T=10, lagged dependent variable coefficient equal 
to 0.8. Note that, differently from us, Everaert and Pozzi conclude in favor of a bias correction based on an iterative 
bootstrap procedure. Nevertheless, results based on of the analytical bias-corrected estimator (the one we use in our study) 
are very similar.  
30 The analysis is performed through the XTLSDVC command in Stata with bias correction up to order O(1/T) and 
Anderson Hsiao as consistent estimator in the first step. Results are not sensitive to the use of alternative options: the 
Spearman rank order coefficient obtained comparing TFP obtained with KIVIET(Anderson-Hsiao) and KIVIET(Arellano-
Bond) is extremely high, 0.997. Standard errors are calculated through bootstrapping. 
31 For more on this see Baltagi (2003).  
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1 2 3 4 5
OLS LSDV KIVIET GMM-AB1 GMM-AB2
ln(y i,t-5 ) 0.950 0.803 0.927 0.836 0.833
(0.009) (0.022) (0.045) (0.035) -0.054
ln(s) 0.069 0.073 0.063 0.077 -0.001
(0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.022) (-0.020)
ln(n+g+δ) -0.273 -0.223 -0.250 -0.265 -0.369
(0.043) (0.066) (0.074) (0.099) (0.080)
Human Capital 0.006 -0.013 -0.021 -0.028 -0.038
(0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
lambda 0.010 0.044 0.015 0.036 0.037
Sargan test (p-value) 0.37 0.28
AB-2 test (p-value) 0.56 0.27
Bootstrap standard errors in KIVIET (no. of  repetitions = 500);
*We include the 2003 observation as our last observation 
Notes:
Standard errors in parenthesis; 
LSDV is the Least Squares with Dummy variables estimators;
Table 1: Estimation of the augmented Solow model
Sample: 76 Countries, 1960-2003 (5 years time-span*)
Dependent variable: ln(yi,t)
Observations: 608
KIVIET is the LSDV estimator with the Kiviet (1995) correction proposed by Bruno (2005);
GMM-AB1 is the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator under the assumption that x's are predetermined;
GMM-AB2 is the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator under the assumption of x's strictly exogneous;
lambda is the corresponding (conditional) convergence coefficient.
 
 
 
With these estimates in hand we can compute our TFP measures. In our LSDV estimates the country 
dummy coefficients, ˆ iμ , are almost invariably statistically significant. In particular, the F-test of the joint 
hypothesis that all the coefficients on our dummies are equal to zero is 3.41 (p-value=0.00) and clearly reject the 
hypothesis of no difference between countries.32 
We obtain estimates of ( )ˆ 0 iA  by means of eq. (8). In all cases, the TFP estimates ( )ˆ 0 iA  are then used 
to compute USii AAA )0(ˆ)0(ˆ)0(
~ = , with USA )0(ˆ  being the estimated TFP value for the USA. Table A1 in the 
Appendix shows the ranking of each country’s TFP estimated value relative to USA, based respectively on 
LSDV, KIVIET and GMM-AB1.33 The Spearman rank order coefficient shows that the TFP rankings remain 
rather constant across the different estimators. In particular, the Spearman coefficient between LSDV-KIVIET 
is 0.95, between KIVIET and GMMAB1 is 0.97, and between LSDV and GMM-AB1 is 0.99.  
A closer inspection of our estimates would further reveal that best and worst performers are almost 
identical across the four estimators, as shown by the data reported in Tables 2(a)-(b). These Tables confirm some 
well known stylized facts, with the industrialised countries at the top of the technology ladder and African 
                                                 
32 Note that individual effects are not directly estimated when GMM-AB1 and KIVIET are used. 
33 A ranking based on a GDP per capita in 1960 is also reported in the Table A1 as a benchmark. 
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countries at the bottom. With reference to the leader country, both LSDV and GMM-AB1 indicate the USA as 
the TFP leader, while in the KIVIET estimates the USA are in fourth place, behind Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Korea. Finally, our estimates strongly confirm that cross-country TFP differences are very wide (the standard 
deviations of TFP and of per capita GDP are 0.254 and 0.292 respectively), and that they are strongly associated 
with the cross-country differences in per capita GDP. In fact, the Spearman rank order coefficient between our 
TFP KIVIET estimates and the 1960-2003 average per capita GDP levels is equal to 0.97.34 To sum up, the 
pattern and the magnitude of TFP heterogeneity as measured by our estimates suggest that a potential for 
technological catch-up does exist for the lagging countries. In the next section we will estimate TFP at two 
points of time to assess to what extent that potential has materialized as an actual source of convergence. 
 
 
United States 1.00 Taiwan 1.62 United States 1.00
Hong Kong 0.84 Hong Kong 1.23 Australia 0.71
Canada 0.75 Korea, Republic of 1.20 Canada 0.70
Australia 0.75 United States 1.00 Hong Kong 0.70
Norway 0.73 Australia 0.68 Norway 0.58
Singapore 0.67 Canada 0.64 Israel 0.56
Israel 0.65 Singapore 0.64 New Zealand 0.55
Taiwan 0.63 Israel 0.60 Taiwan 0.52
Barbados 0.61 Ireland 0.56 Barbados 0.48
Switzerland 0.60 Norway 0.47 Switzerland 0.46
Japan 0.59 Barbados 0.45 Ireland 0.45
Denmark 0.59 New Zealand 0.39 Japan 0.45
Ireland 0.58 Japan 0.38 Denmark 0.44
Iceland 0.58 Malaysia 0.38 Singapore 0.44
New Zealand 0.57 Iceland 0.28 Sweden 0.44
Sweden 0.56 Belgium 0.25 Korea, Republic of 0.42
Austria 0.56 Sweden 0.25 Iceland 0.40
Netherlands 0.55 United Kingdom 0.25 United Kingdom 0.40
United Kingdom 0.55 Mauritius 0.25 Belgium 0.40
Belgium 0.54 Denmark 0.25 Netherlands 0.39
LSDV KIVIET GMM-AB1
Table 2a: Relative TFP levels - Best 20
 
Zambia 0.020 Niger 0.002 Niger 0.008
Niger 0.022 Zambia 0.003 Togo 0.009
Togo 0.022 Togo 0.003 Zambia 0.009
Malawi 0.023 Mali 0.005 Mali 0.010
Mali 0.025 Nepal 0.005 Malawi 0.011
Nepal 0.029 Kenya 0.006 Nepal 0.011
Kenya 0.032 Malawi 0.007 Kenya 0.015
Lesotho 0.041 Senegal 0.007 Mozambique 0.018
Senegal 0.041 Jamaica 0.010 Senegal 0.018
Uganda 0.041 Nicaragua 0.012 Lesotho 0.021
Mozambique 0.042 Zimbabwe 0.012 Uganda 0.021
Honduras 0.060 Mozambique 0.012 Honduras 0.030
Ghana 0.066 Honduras 0.014 Pakistan 0.032
Pakistan 0.067 Lesotho 0.015 Zimbabwe 0.033
India 0.071 Uganda 0.016 Jamaica 0.037
Zimbabwe 0.071 Bolivia 0.020 India 0.038
Syria 0.073 Iran 0.023 Ghana 0.038
Bolivia 0.078 Pakistan 0.026 Syria 0.042
Jamaica 0.082 Cameroon 0.028 Bolivia 0.043
Cameroon 0.089 Jordan 0.028 Cameroon 0.044
Table 2b: Relative TFP levels - Worst 20
LSDV KIVIET GMM-AB1
 
                                                 
34 Lower correlation coefficient values are obtained when TFP estimates are compared with initial levels (1960) of per capita 
GDP: 0.85 (GDP-GMM), 0.87 (GDP-LSDV) and 0.71 (GDP-KIVIET). 
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5. Detecting technological convergence: empirical results 
To detect how much TFP convergence is present in our sample, we estimate TFP-levels for the 
following two sub-samples: 1960-1980 and 1985-2003. Estimating TFP-levels for our two subperiods further 
exacerbates the problems associated with small sample bias. As reported above, in such conditions Monte Carlo 
results show that KIVIET should be preferred over the other estimators. Moreover, as we will see presently, the 
KIVIET AR(1) coefficient stays within the estimated upper (OLS) and lower (LSDV) bounds in both 
subperiods, while the same is not true for the GMM-AB1 estimator.35 As a consequence, in the remaining part of 
the paper we will do not report the results based on GMM-AB1 and focus on those based on KIVIET. 
 
Dependent Variable: ln (y i,t )
Obs. 304
OLS LSDV KIVIET OLS LSDV KIVIET
1960-80 1960-80 1960-80 1985-2003 1985-2003 1985-2003
ln(y i,t-5 ) 0.949 0.587 0.744 0.964 0.527 0.788
(0.014) (0.060) (0.140) (0.012) (0.043) (0.093)
ln(s) 0.074 0.056 0.057 0.038 -0.019 -0.022
(0.117) (0.027) (0.065) (0.014) (0.025) (0.030)
ln(n+g+δ) -0.125 -0.206 -0.149 -0.367 -0.157 -0.348
(0.064) (0.136) (0.24) (0.055) (0.077) (0.106)
Human Capital 0.010 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.0005
(0.005) (0.020) (0.044) (0.005) (0.016) (0.021)
lambda 0.010 0.107 0.059 0.007 0.128 0.048
Bootstrap standard errors in KIVIET (no. of  repetitions = 500);
*We include the 2003 observation as our last observation 
Sample: 76 Countries, 5 years time-span*
Table 3: Estimation of the augmented Solow model (two subperiods)
lambda is the corresponding (conditional) convergence coefficient.
Notes:
Standard errors in parenthesis;
LSDV is the Least Squares with Dummy variables estimators;
KIVIET is the LSDV estimator with the Kiviet (1995) correction proposed by Bruno (2005);
 
 
As before, we estimate equation (11) and save the two different series of ˆ iμ . Results are shown in Table 
3, which shows the KIVIET estimates of the AR (1) coefficient together with the OLS and LSDV estimates.  
The convergence coefficient is significant in both subperiods, while the other regressors are non 
significant in most cases, with the exception of ln( )n gδ+ + , significant and with the expected sign in the 
second subperiods. As before, ˆ iμ  are almost invariably significant. The F test enables us to reject the hypothesis 
of no difference between countries for both subperiods.36 Again, we apply equation (8) to our KIVIET estimates 
to obtain two series of ( )ˆ 0 iA , and then compute the two indexes 1,1,1, ˆˆ~ −−− = tUStiti AAA  (for the initial period, 
                                                 
35 In particular, the GMM-AB1 AR(1) coefficient the in the second sub-sample is lower than the downward biased LSDV 
one. Results are available upon request. 
36 The value of the F-test for the joint hypothesis that all the coefficients on our country dummies are equal to zero is 1.92 
for the first subperiod (p-value 0.00), and 4.25 for the second subperiod (p-value 0.00). 
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1960-80) and tUStiti AAA ,,, ˆˆ
~ =  (for the subsequent period, 1985-2003). 
Our estimated TFP values for the two subperiods, and the change of the ranking of each country, are 
shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. Before analysing the whole distribution over  the two subperiods, it is 
worth noticing that in our estimates the USA have moved from the second place in 1960-1980 to the leading 
position in 1985-2003, and that  few countries have obtained remarkable positive changes of rank – among them, 
Korea (+27 positions), Singapore (+25), Taiwan (+23), Hong Kong (+19) and Thailand (+18). Notice that these 
are also the countries who have achieved high growth in GDP per capita. This association between TFP and 
GDP per capita growth is confirmed when we extend the analysis to the whole sample: the observed changes in 
the rankings of TFP and of GDP per capita are highly correlated (0.96). While obtaining fast growth in TFP is 
not simple, it appears to be a key factor to achieve fast GDP per capita growth.37  
With regard to other characteristics of whole cross-country TFP distribution, the main one for our purpose is the 
absence of an overall process of TFP convergence. Comparing the values of the standard deviation for the two 
series of initial and subsequent TFP, we observe that TFP dispersion is virtually constant across the two 
subperiods (0.255 and 0.254 respectively). This lack of overall TFP convergence is further confirmed by Figure 1, 
which illustrates the absence of significant changes in the distribution between the initial TFP levels (straight 
line) and subsequent TFP levels (dotted line).  
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Figure 1: Distribution of TFP levels
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 See Young (1994) for a different view on  the role of technology in the fast growth of some Asian countries. 
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In both periods, a twin-peak pattern does characterize the distribution, with less advanced countries, in 
particular, forming a well defined group. Similar results have been reported in previous studies.38  
As it is well known, the absence of a strong process of TFP convergence may hide interesting but more 
complex dynamic patterns. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the two-period TFP estimates in our whole 
sample of countries. The 45 degree line shows the locus where each country’s relative (to USA) TFP level would 
be time-invariant. Since most countries are below the 45 degree line, they have clearly underperformed with 
respect to the USA in terms of TFP growth. Only seven countries seems to be significantly improving on the 
USA’s performance – namely, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, Ireland and Malaysia. For few 
other countries, the initial gap decreases, but far less significantly.39 
The robustness of these results has been assessed using a different specification of the model and a 
different estimator. In particular, almost identical results have been obtained replicating the whole KIVIET 
analysis excluding human capital from our regressions, and using non Kiviet-corrected LSDV estimates 
of iA )0(
~
. 
 
6. Technology convergence and the role of human capital 
In sections 4 and 5 above we noticed that human capital was never significant in our regression analysis 
on GDP per capita convergence. This is not the end of our search for a role of human capital in growth and 
convergence, however. The Nelson-Phelps approach40 to technology diffusion suggests the existence of a 
different and less direct role played by human capital in growth. In particular, in Nelson and Phelps (1966) 
human capital stocks determine to what extent a lagging country can extract technological spillovers from an 
existing gap between its technology level and the world technology frontier (or the technology adopted in a 
leader country).  
                                                 
38 For instance, Feyrer (2003), using a sample ranging from 1970 to 1989, shows that the productivity residual seems to be 
moving towards a twin peaked distribution with the low peak in productivity emerging as particularly robust result.  
39 See also Figure A1 in the Appendix, where the relationship between on TFP growth and initial levels is shown. 
40 For more on this see Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Hojo (2003). This second study uses fixed effect to estimate TFP and 
finds a positive role of human capital in explaining cross-country differences in TFP levels.   
DZA
ARG
AUS
AUT
BRB
BEL
BOL
BRA
CMR
CAN
CHL
COL CRI
DNK
DOMECUSLV
FIN
FRA
GHA
GRC
GTMND
HKG
ISL
INDID
IRN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JAM
JPN
JORKE
KOR
LSOMWI
MYS
LI
MUS
MEX
OZNPL
NLD
NZL
NICR
NOR
PAK
PANPRYPERPH
PRT
S N
SGP
ZAF
ESP
K
SWE
CHE
Y
TWN
THA
TG
TTO
TUNTUU
GBR
USA
U Y VEN
ZMBZWE0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 T
FP
0 .5 1
Initial TFP
Countries relative performance
Figure 2: Two periods TFP estimates
 14
Our estimates of TFP levels enable us to test this hypothesis. Table 4 below shows the results of several 
OLS cross-section regressions41 with our measure of TFP growth rates (1960-2003 averages42) as the dependent 
variable, and the initial value of TFP and the level of human capital among a number of different regressors. Due 
to data availability, in this section the sample is reduced from 76 to 73 countries.43 In all the regressions the 
human capital index, Hi , is defined as the average value of our initial subperiod, 1960 to 198044. All our 
regressions have been replicated using the 1960 human capital stocks to better control for possible endogeneity 
problems, but our results did not change significantly.45 We favor the use of the average 1960-80 values because 
during the first subperiod many countries went through take rapid increases in education attainments. 
We start with a conditional convergence model, with human capital as the main conditioning factor. 
Using our TFP estimates we can thus regress: 
 
iiioi HAGRA εψψψ +++= 21 )0(~         (13) 
 
where iGRA  represents the annual average 1960-2003 growth rate of relative TFP USii AAA ˆˆ
~ = , iA )0(~  is the 
initial level of relative TFP and Hi is, as said above, the stock of human capital in the population. Differently 
from a standard GDP convergence analysis, equation (13) is broadly consistent with the Nelson and Phelps 
(1966) original idea that human capital stocks determine to what extent a lagging country can profit – through 
technological spillovers – from a given technology gap. Indeed, the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis postulates a 
process of conditional convergence in which the conditioning factor is H: as a consequence, in cross-country 
growth regressions iA )0(
~
 is expected to exhibit a significant inverse relation with iGRA , and Hi  a positive 
one.46 
Model 1 in Table 4 confirms that initial human capital stocks are positively correlated with TFP growth 
rates, while Model 2 confirms the lack of absolute convergence in TFP levels (see also section 5 above). Model 3 
implies that a process of convergence conditional to the average stock of human capital in the population does 
take place. As expected, the coefficient of the initial TFP value is negative and significant, and the coefficient of 
human capital is positive and significant. 
 To be more specific about the role played by human capital in this technology catch-up process, we use 
a model developed by Benhabib and Spiegel (2005). This model uses the original formulation of the catch-up 
term proposed by Nelson and Phelps (1966), characterized by the interaction between H and TFP. Besides, 
Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) extend significantly the Nelson-Phelps approach to include the possibility that, 
unless a critical value of human capital stock is reached, the catch-up mechanism is not activated. This extension 
is based on a “logistic” model of technology diffusion (see below). Thus, this model allows us to answer two 
related questions concerning the relationship between human capital and technology growth and adoption: first, 
how important is the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis in explaining the cross-country variance in TFP growth rates? 
Second: can a low level of human capital stock make it impossible for a lagging country to exploit its technology 
gap? In other words, can lagging countries be split in two different clubs (converging v non converging ones), 
according to their level of human capital?  
As Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) show, the linear version of the logistic model can be written as: 
 
                                                 
41 All results in both Table 4 and 5 report robust standard errors. Note that our conclusions are not sensitive to the standard 
error in use: results with the usual OLS standard errors are, in fact, very similar. 
42 As in Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), we calculate the average TFP growth rate as the log-difference between the estimated 
final and initial TFP divided by the relevant time span.  
43 We are excluding Lesotho, Mozambique and Nepal. For these countries we could not find data for social infrastructure, 
additional variables used in this analysis.  
44 See footnote 22. 
45 These results are available upon request.  
46 The cross-section implication of the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis can be summed up as follows: consider a sample of 
countries who are away from their stationary positions, and who are characterized by different values of (constant) human 
capital stocks and of TFP (measured in terms of the leader’s level). In such a sample all countries converge towards the 
common long-run growth rate, with their transitional TFP growth rate explained by their current technology gaps and 
human capital stock. 
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where L identifies the “leader” country (the USA, in our panel). In this model, TFP growth depends on two 
factors: first, a country’s own innovation capability, that in turn depends on its stock of human capital ( igH ); 
second, an interactive component, ( )Lii AAcH , that should capture the process of catch-up described by the 
Nelson-Phelps hypothesis, in which the rate of technology diffusion depends on the existing technology gap and, 
again on the stock of human capital.  
In this model, as Li AA  goes to zero ii AA&  tends to a finite value, namely iHcg )( + . An implication 
of this is that even an extremely large gap may not be sufficient to allow a lagging country to grow faster than the 
leading one, and therefore to be part of a “converging club”. This setting extends the original hypothesis 
developed in Nelson and Phelps (1966) and in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), in which all countries are supposed 
to be able to (conditionally) converge, whatever their level of human capital.47  
Formally, since growth in the leading country is equal to LgH , the condition for the lagging one to 
catch-up is:  
  
                    
( )
cg
HgH Li +=
*                                      (15) 
where HL is the human capital stock of the leader nation. So, for catch up to take place, the stock of human 
capital in the lagging country has to be larger than a critical value defined by *iH . Whenever this condition is not 
met, divergence will occur because too small human capital stocks do not allow a country to exploit the potential 
advantage associated with its backwardness. To transfer technology from abroad, backwardness needs to be 
offset by enough human capital.  
The main empirical implications of this model may be examined using a cross-country regression model 
on TFP growth defined by: 
 
iiiii AHHGRA ελλλ +⋅−+= ])0(~[210        (16) 
 
where )(1 cg +=λ  and c=2λ . In this case, point estimates with 12 ˆˆ λλ >  indirectly imply a rejection of the 
model since a negative point estimate of g would represent an implausible result.  
In Model 4 we regress equation (16) and find that, as expected, human capital is positive and significant 
while the interactive term is negative and significant. Moreover, we find that 21 ˆˆ λλ > , thus implying a plausible 
positive point estimate of g.  
As for the existence of a critical value of H as defined by equation (15) above, our estimates yield the 
following, and perhaps surprising,48 result: the value of average (1960-80) years of schooling under which 
countries would diverge in TFP from the leader is 0.89. Within our panel of countries, this value is very low: only 
Mali and Niger are below this human capital threshold. All other countries are supposed to have enough human 
capital to be able to activate the Nelson-Phelps mechanism of technology adoption from abroad. In other words, 
our estimates of the logistic model give strong support to the original version of the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis, 
in which the technology distance from the leader represents an opportunity for all the lagging countries. 
The robustness of our results has been further tested by introducing various measures of institutional 
                                                 
47 In those two models, a level of the technology gap always exists that allows a lagging country to converge towards a 
steady-state in which levels of TFP are different, depending on levels of H, but TFP growth rates are equalized across 
countries. 
48 Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) find that 27 out of 75 countries were below their estimated threshold of H in 1960. 
Interestingly, the number of countries below the threshold decreases dramatically in time: using the 1995 values of H, only 4 
countries were still below the estimated critical value.  
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quality. The importance of institutional quality (or “social infrastructure”) in the explanation of the cross-country 
distribution of TFP levels has gained more and more attention in the last few years, starting from the seminal 
contribution by Hall and Jones (1999).49  In their view, social infrastructure is formed of “…the institutions and 
government policies that determine the economic environment within which individuals accumulate skills, and 
firms accumulate capital and produce output” (p. 84). In particular, a good social infrastructure should limit the 
scope for rent-seeking and other unproductive activities and favor the adoption of new ideas and new 
technologies from abroad. Moreover, controlling for institutional quality is important since human capital can act 
as a proxy for it (Tabellini 2007, Guiso 2007). 
Our first index of social infrastructure, “GADP”, is a widely used cross-country index of property right 
protection (see Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Tabellini, 2007).50 As in Hall and Jones (1999), we 
also use a second measure of social infrastructure, obtained by computing a simple average of GADP and an 
index of openness to trade, based on Sachs and Warner (1995).51 
 
Table 4: TFP convergence, average years of education and social infrastructure
OLS, 73 Countries
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Human Capital 0.009 0.016 0.017 0.009 0.009 0.01 0.009
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Initial TFP 0.055 -0.075 -0.155 -0.115
(0.016) (0.033) (0.038) (0.029)
HK*TFP -0.010 -0.015 -0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
GADP 0.210 0.174
(0.035) (0.032)
GADP&Openess 0.137 0.063
(0.019) (0.014)
R 2 0.26 0.09 0.31 0.33 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.47
Notes:
Dependent variable: average TFP growth 1960-2003
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; 
Human capital is the total average years of schooling in the total population aged 15 and over. See Barro and Lee (2000). Data
are averages of the period 1960-80;
The variable HK*TFP is formed by multiplying Initial TFP times Human Capital;
The variable GADP is formed by the average of five categories, namely: (i) corruption, (ii) risk of expropriation, (iii) 
government repudiation, (iv) law and order, (v) bureaucratic quality. See also footnote 48.  
 
Overall, our results show that the two measures of institutional quality are always positive determinants 
                                                 
49 See also Acemoglu et al. (2001), Parente and Prescott (1999), Tabellini (2007). 
50 See the International Risk Guide compiled by Political Risk Services. GADP (namely, “government anti diversion policies”) 
is formed by the average of five categories, namely: (i) corruption, (ii) risk of expropriation, (iii) government repudiation, as 
measures of the government as a potential diverter for private investment; (iv) law and order, (v) bureaucratic quality as 
measures of the capability of the government as a protector for private investment. See Hall and Jones (1999) and Knack 
and Keefer (1995) for further details. 
51 As Hausmann and Pritchett (2005) remind us, the Sachs-Warner dummy is a measure that captures broad economic 
reforms more than just an index about trade openness. We have also performed the same analysis using only the index of 
openness to trade obtaining almost identical results.  
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of the TFP convergence process. In Models 5 and 6 we have TFP growth rates as the dependent variable and the 
initial value of TFP, human capital and two proxies of social infrastructure among regressors. The coefficient on 
average years of schooling does decrease from 0.016 to 0.009 but remains positive and significant in both 
regressions, while coefficients on both proxies for social infrastructure are rather stable. Similar results are 
obtained using the logistic specification (Models 7 and 8). In particular, these models confirm the significant role 
of the catch-up term, while they shed some doubt on the role of H as a determinant of own-country innovation. 
In sum, the broad set of results shown in this section yields strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis 
that human capita is an important positive determinant of the process of technology catch-up for the great 
majority of countries in our sample. Indeed, the Nelson-Phelps hypothesis turns out to valid for nearly all 
countries in our panel, to be robust to different model specification and to the inclusion of various indexes of 
social infrastructure.  
It also shows that the influence exerted by human capital on TFP growth is independent – to a 
significant extent – of a country’s institutional quality. This result is in contrast with the idea that “the 
determinants of social infrastructure affect [productivity] only through social infrastructure and not directly”, as 
put forward by Hall and Jones (1999), p. 99. It is also in contrast with previous results where the role of human 
capital in TFP growth turned out to be very weak in the presence of controls for trade policy (Miller and 
Upadhyay, 2000) and other social infrastructure controls (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005).  
The confirmation of a direct role played by human capital is worth underlying because of the obvious 
but important policy implications about the effectiveness of investment in education, even in countries where 
social infrastructure is lacking. This conclusion would be even stronger if education play a second, less direct role 
in TFP growth through the influence exerted on social infrastructure. As Glaeser (2001) suggests, “schools are a 
primary area where social capital is developed”, and perhaps where favorable conditions for the creation of 
institutions of good quality are laid down. 
 
7.  Stages of developments and different educational attainments 
Finally, we run our cross-country regressions on iGRA  using again equation (13) but decomposing total 
schooling into three components: average years of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling.52 Recent catch-up 
models suggest that imitation and innovation may require different types of skills (Vandenbussche et al., 2006). In 
particular, innovation activities are certainly influenced by higher levels of education, while imitation may be 
performed by labour forces with lower levels of skills. We may thus expect a different role on TFP growth for 
different levels of education.  
Table 5 shows how equation (13)53 performs when we decompose human capital in all three levels of 
education. We find that only the lower levels of schooling seems to matter in the simpler specifications (Models 
1 and 2), while only secondary schooling stays positive and significant once our social infrastructure indicator are 
used as controls (Model 3). However, we also find that these results change significantly if we divide the sample 
between initial high-tech and low-tech countries. In Model 4 we use the specification of Model 3 for a sample to 
21 High-tech countries,54 whose an initial level of relative TFP larger than 0.3; in Model 5 we do the same for a 
sample formed by the 52 remaining low-tech countries. As for the choice of the cut-off value, the latter is based 
on Figure 1, which indirectly suggests the existence of two clubs, with a cut-off value of the initial TFP level 
placed approximately between 0.3-0.4. Our estimates of Models 4 and 5 show that for advanced countries only 
tertiary education seems to matter while for Low-tech countries only the secondary school coefficient shows a 
significant and positive sign. These results would be even stronger if we used as cut-off value of 0.4 instead of 
0.3, implying a smaller group of High-tech economies.55 To sum up, these results are suggestive rather than 
conclusive. Nevertheless, they do suggest that the principal gains from education for laggard countries, in terms 
                                                 
52 They are the average years of primary, secondary and tertiary education in the total population aged 15 and over. See 
Barro and Lee (2000). Data are averages of the period 1960-80. Redoing regressions in Tables 4 and 5 using initial year 
(1960) human capital observations to better control endogeneity problems changes the results only trivially.  
53 We exclude from this analysis the logistic specification since it has previously produced implausible results. 
54 These are defined by countries with and initial relative level of TFP larger than 0.3, and include Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherland, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, UK and USA.  
55 In this case the High-tech sample reduces to 17 countries (Argentina, Finland, Japan and Trinidad & Tobago excluded).  
 18
of TFP growth at least, stem from investing in lower levels of education. Conversely, in more advanced countries 
investing in tertiary education seems to pay higher returns, presumably because growth relies more on own-
innovation, an activity that requires a higher skilled labour force than imitation. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
High-tech Low-tech
Initial TFP -0.077 -0.117 -0.049 -0.272
(0.035) (0.037) (0.016) (0.073)
GADP 0.212 0.158 0.235
(0.036) (0.035) (0.047)
Degree -0.105 -0.077 0.004 0.074 -0.10
(-0.055) (0.057) (0.048) (0.034) (0.092)
Secondary School 0.019 0.030 0.021 -0.005 0.045
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013)
Primary School 0.012 0.015 0.005 -0.008 0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
R 2 0.30 0.34 0.56 0.67 0.64
Cross section OLS, 73 Countries
Dependent variable: average TFP growth 1960-2003
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; 
The variable GADP is calculated using data on (i) corruption, (ii) risk of expropriation, (iii) government repudiation, (iv)
law and order, (v) bureaucratic quality. See footnote 48;
Degree, secondary school and primary school are the average years of primary, secondary and tertiary education in the
total population aged 15 and over. See Barro and Lee (2000). Data are averages of the period 1960-80;
The High-tech group is formed by 21 countries whose initial TFP level is greater than 0.3, while Low-tech are the 
remaining 52 countries. See also footnote 51.
Table 5: TFP convergence, different levels of education and social infrastructure
 
 
8. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to assess the existence of technology convergence across a sample of 76 
countries between 1960 and 2003. Different methodologies have been proposed to measure TFP heterogeneity 
across countries, but only a few of them try to capture the presence of technology convergence as a separate 
component from the standard (capital-deepening) source of convergence. To distinguish between these two 
components of convergence, we have proposed and applied a fixed-effect panel methodology. Robustness of 
results is assessed using different estimation procedures such as simple LSDV, Kiviet-corrected LSDV, and 
GMM à la Arellano and Bond (1991).  
Our empirical analysis confirms the presence of a high and persistent level of TFP heterogeneity across 
countries. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of a global process of TFP convergence, since the dispersion of 
the estimated TFP levels remained constant through time. Within this aggregate persistence, important changes 
are detected by our analysis. In particular, differently from previous results reported in the literature, based on 
shorter sample periods, we find that the USA, the TFP leader, is currently distancing itself further from the rest 
of the countries. In this new context, European countries, with few exceptions, seem to worsen their relative 
TFP ranking, while East Asian countries appear as the major winners.  
As for why cross-country TFP gaps tend to be persistent, we find that cross-country TFP growth 
follows a process of convergence conditional to the stock of human capital in the population. Following 
Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), we also test whether a critical value of human capital stock has to be reached in a 
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lagging country in order to activate the mechanism of technology catch-up. In contrast with previously reported 
evidence, we find little evidence in favor of this hypothesis, since in our results even very low level of human 
capital stocks allow a country to enter a “conditional TFP convergence club”. Taken together, these results 
strongly support the original version of the Nelson and Phelps (1966) hypothesis, in which the technology 
distance from the leader represents a source of conditional convergence for all (or at least for the great majority 
of) the lagging countries. Moreover, results also imply there is a plausible link between stages of development 
and returns to different levels of education as suggested by recent studies. 
Our results on the important role played by human capital in the catch-up mechanism are robust to the 
inclusion of various and widely used indexes of social infrastructure and openness. To put it in a nutshell, 
investing in human capital still represents one of the best options available to developing countries beset by too 
low per capita incomes. 
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Countries Rank with GDP Rank with LSDV Rank with KIVIET Rank with GMM-AB1
Algeria 38 46 55 51
Argentina 20 32 39 31
Australia 6 4 5 2
Austria 12 17 22 21
Barbados 15 9 11 9
Belgium 13 20 16 19
Bolivia 55 59 61 58
Brazil 41 39 47 43
Cameroon 57 57 58 57
Canada 8 3 6 3
Chile 31 33 30 32
Colombia 44 41 42 40
Costa Rica 34 31 27 30
Denmark 3 12 20 13
Dominican Republic 50 38 34 38
Ecuador 52 50 49 47
El Salvador 43 47 53 50
Finland 14 23 26 23
France 9 21 24 22
Ghana 71 64 44 60
Greece 23 27 29 28
Guatemala 45 48 51 53
Honduras 58 65 64 65
Hong Kong 26 2 2 4
Iceland 19 14 15 17
India 65 62 52 61
Indonesia 62 52 41 54
Iran 33 49 60 55
Ireland 25 13 9 11
Israel 17 7 8 6
Italy 16 24 32 24
Jamaica 37 58 68 62
Japan 18 11 13 12
Jordan 39 53 57 52
Table A1: Rank of relative TFP levels obtained using different estimators
 Countries Rank with GDP Rank with LSDV Rank with KIVIET Rank with GMM-AB1
Kenya 67 70 71 70
Korea, Republic of 53 22 3 16
Lesotho 74 69 63 67
Malawi 76 73 70 72
Malaysia 54 28 14 27
Mali 75 72 73 73
Mauritius 40 26 19 25
Mexico 35 37 40 37
Mozambique 72 66 65 69
Nepal 73 71 72 71
Netherlands 5 18 21 20
New Zealand 7 15 12 7
Nicaragua 32 56 67 56
Niger 68 75 76 76
Norway 10 5 10 5
Pakistan 64 63 59 64
Panama 42 35 25 33
Paraguay 47 42 38 39
Peru 36 51 56 49
Philippines 56 54 46 46
Portugal 27 30 36 34
Senegal 60 68 69 68
Singapore 28 6 7 14
South Africa 29 34 35 35
Spain 21 25 28 26
Sri Lanka 63 55 37 48
Sweden 4 16 17 15
Switzerland 1 10 23 10
Syria 69 60 50 59
Taiwan 49 8 1 8
Thailand 59 44 31 41
Togo 61 74 74 75
Trinidad &Tobago 22 29 33 29
Tunisia 51 43 43 44
Turkey 46 45 48 45
Uganda 70 67 62 66
United Kingdom 11 19 18 18
United States 2 1 4 1
Uruguay 30 36 45 36
Venezuela 24 40 54 42
Zambia 66 76 75 74
Zimbabwe 48 61 66 63
Table A1 (continue)
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Countries Relative TFP levels 1960-80 ranking 1960-80
Relative TFP 
levels 1985-2003
ranking 1985-
2003 Change of rank
Algeria 0.078 39 0.031 43 -4
Argentina 0.312 21 0.081 32 -11
Australia 0.643 6 0.634 7 -1
Austria 0.509 13 0.528 10 3
Barbados 0.446 15 0.144 28 -13
Belgium 0.474 14 0.420 15 -1
Bolivia 0.031 55 0.006 58 -3
Brazil 0.084 38 0.042 38 0
Cameroon 0.023 57 0.005 60 -3
Canada 0.710 3 0.634 6 -3
Chile 0.115 34 0.092 31 3
Colombia 0.062 43 0.029 44 -1
Costa Rica 0.166 29 0.056 33 -4
Denmark 0.704 4 0.534 9 -5
Dominican Republic 0.046 49 0.028 45 4
Ecuador 0.046 50 0.018 49 1
El Salvador 0.063 42 0.015 50 -8
Finland 0.390 18 0.374 20 -2
France 0.554 10 0.465 13 -3
Ghana 0.002 75 0.001 68 7
Greece 0.206 26 0.154 26 0
Guatemala 0.054 45 0.012 53 -8
Honduras 0.018 58 0.004 62 -4
Hong Kong 0.235 23 0.713 4 19
Iceland 0.549 11 0.556 8 3
India 0.006 69 0.004 63 6
Indonesia 0.011 61 0.010 55 6
Iran 0.095 36 0.031 42 -6
Ireland 0.213 25 0.395 18 7
Israel 0.418 16 0.455 14 2
Italy 0.400 17 0.338 21 -4
Jamaica 0.047 47 0.012 52 -5
Table A2: Estimated TFP levels 1960-1980 and 1985-2003 KIVIET
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Countries Relative TFP levels 1960-80 ranking 1960-80
Relative TFP 
levels 1985-2003
ranking 1985-
2003 Change of rank
Japan 0.336 19 0.419 16 3
Jordan 0.095 37 0.018 48 -11
Kenya 0.007 68 0.001 69 -1
Korea, Republic of 0.037 52 0.168 25 27
Lesotho 0.004 71 0.002 65 6
Malawi 0.002 76 0.000 76 0
Malaysia 0.047 48 0.109 30 18
Mali 0.003 74 0.001 71 3
Mauritius 0.096 35 0.145 27 8
Mexico 0.123 33 0.051 36 -3
Mozambique 0.007 66 0.001 70 -4
Nepal 0.004 73 0.001 67 6
Netherlands 0.643 7 0.494 11 -4
New Zealand 0.613 8 0.382 19 -11
Nicaragua 0.137 32 0.012 54 -22
Niger 0.008 63 0.001 74 -11
Norway 0.584 9 0.811 3 6
Pakistan 0.007 65 0.005 61 4
Panama 0.067 41 0.050 37 4
Paraguay 0.061 44 0.024 46 -2
Peru 0.070 40 0.015 51 -11
Philippines 0.031 56 0.010 56 0
Portugal 0.164 31 0.171 24 7
Senegal 0.012 60 0.002 66 -6
Singapore 0.200 27 0.917 2 25
South Africa 0.172 28 0.053 35 -7
Spain 0.273 22 0.266 22 0
Sri Lanka 0.008 64 0.009 57 7
Sweden 0.645 5 0.467 12 -7
Switzerland 1.130 1 0.692 5 -4
Syria 0.010 62 0.003 64 -2
Taiwan 0.052 46 0.217 23 23
Thailand 0.014 59 0.032 41 18
Togo 0.007 67 0.001 75 -8
Trinidad &Tobago 0.315 20 0.122 29 -9
Tunisia 0.036 53 0.037 40 13
Turkey 0.040 51 0.023 47 4
Uganda 0.005 70 0.001 72 -2
United Kingdom 0.512 12 0.418 17 -5
United States 1.000 2 1.000 1 1
Uruguay 0.166 30 0.053 34 -4
Venezuela 0.227 24 0.042 39 -15
Zambia 0.004 72 0.001 73 -1
Zimbabwe 0.034 54 0.006 59 -5
Table A2 (continued)
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Figure A1: TFP growth versus initial levels
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